

STATE OF MINNESOTA
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

FOR THE MINNESOTA OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW BOARD

In the Matter of Harry D. Peterson,
Commissioner, Department of Labor
and Industry, State of Minnesota,

Complainant,

VS.

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND CIDER

Congra Inc. ,

Respondent.

The above-entitled matter came on for hearing before State Hearing Examiner George A. Beck at 9:30 a.m. on Thursday, May 7, 1981 in Room 552 of the Space Center Building, 444 Lafayette Road, Saint Paul, Minnesota. The hearing continued to the following day. Briefs were submitted by the parties, the last of which was received on July 15, 1981, and the record closed on that date.

Steven M. Gunn, Special Assistant Attorney General, Fifth Floor, Space Center Building 444 Lafayette Road, Saint Paul, Minnesota 55101, appeared on behalf of the Complainant- Dean G. Kratz, Esq. , of the firm of McGrath, North, O'Malley & Kratz, 300 Continental Building, Omaha, Nebraska 68102, appeared on behalf of the Respondent.

The following witnesses testified at the hearing: Harvey Wickman, Senior Occupational Safety and Health Investigator, Department of Labor and Industry; Irvin Buchholz, Plant Manager, and Wayne Bellinger, Corporate Safety Director, ConAgra, Inc.

Notice is hereby given, pursuant to Minn. Stat. 182.664, subd. 5 (1980), that the Findings of Fact and Order of the Hearing Examiner may be appealed to the Minnesota Occupational Safety and Health Review Board by the employer,

employee or their authorized representatives within 30 days following the publication of said Findings and Order.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

The issues in this proceeding are whether or not the Respondent has violated OSHA standards relating to a facility, for quick drenching or flushing of the eyes, relating to the operation of its manlift, relating to its electrical equipment, relating to the provision of proper guardrails on metal bins, and whether or not the penalties proposed for the alleged violations are proper.

Based upon all of the proceedings herein, the Hearing Examiner makes the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. On November 27, 1979, Harvey Wickman, a Senior Occupational Safety and Health Investigator for the State of Minnesota, inspected the Respondent's workplace located at 309 West Stanton, Fergus Falls, Minnesota. The Respondent operates a grain-handling and flour manufacturing facility and employs approximately 25 or 30 people at that location. (T. A11) Wickman was accompanied on his inspection by Irvin Buchholz, the plant manager, and a representative of the employees' union. (T. A12) The inspection lasted two days. (T. A13)

2. The Respondent's facility consists, in part, of a grain receiving area where the grain is dumped and then moved by belts called legs to storage in steel or concrete bins. (T. A15-17) The grain is then moved from the bins for use as needed in the flour mill operation of the facility which consists of roller mills, sifters, cleaners, legs and a horizontal auger (T. A17) The Respondent uses four cyclone cleaners in the mill operation and maintains a daily 'housekeeping program for sweeping and cleaning up grain dust and flour dust. (T. A18; B53-54) The facility experiences two or three spills of wheat in the elevator each year. (T. B5 8) Spills can happen throughout the elevator and mill. Two employees called sweepers work full-time to clean up dust and spills. Other employees work part-time on cleaning. (T. B64) There was and normally, is a light dust located on equipment throughout the mill area of

the facility but there was no dust suspended in the air. (T. A.17; B55, 57)

Clain and flour dust is a normal part of the operation of an elevator and flour mill. (T. B6 7)

3. As a result of this inspection, the Complainant issued two citations to the Respondent on December 11, 1979. The first citation alleged 11 non-serious violations of OSH standards. The second citation alleged eight serious violations of standards, statutes and rules. By a letter dated December 28, 1979, the Respondent gave notice to the Complainant that it wished to contest Citation No. 1, Items 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 11, and Citation No. 2, Items 1 through 8.

4. (Xi January 28, 1980 the Complainant issued a Summons and Notice to Respondent and Complaint upon the Respondent. The Complaint alleged penalties as follows:

Citation No.	Item No.	Proposed Penaltv
1	4	72.00
1	5	72.00
1	11	7 2.00
2	1	48.00
2	2	192.00
2	3	144.00
2	4	10 8.00
2	5	108.00
2	6	60.00
2	7	108 00
2	8	144.00

The Respondent filed its Answer with the OSH Review Board on February 1, 1980. (An December 8, 1980, the OSH Review Board issued a Notice of Hearing setting this matter on for hearing on March 12, 1981. The hearing was later continued to May 7, 1981. The Respondent Filed a Certificate of Service of the Notice of Hearing on affected employees with the OSH Review Board on December 12, 1980.

5. At the commencement of the hearing, the Complainant moved to dismiss Citation No. 1, Item No. 1, and Citation No. 2, Item No. 4, including its proposed penalty. Additionally, the Complainant moved to combine Items Nos. 4 and 11 of Citation No. 1, thereby withdrawing the proposed penalty for Item No. 11 and enforcing the standard cited in Item No. 4. The Complainant also moved to combine Items Nos. 2 and 7 of Citation no. 2 so as to withdraw the proposed penalty for Item No. 7 and enforce the standard cited in Item No. 2.

The Motions were granted. During the hearing, the Complainant also moved to dismiss Item No. 8 of Citation No. 2 and the proposed penalty and the motion was granted. (T. B17)

Citation No. 1, Item NO. 2.

6. In its Citation, the Complainant alleged at violation of 29 C.F.R.

1910. 151(c) and described the violation as follows:

Failure to provide suitable facilities for quick drenching or flushing of the eyes for immediate emergency use in the lab.
(Ex. 1)

7. The Respondent maintains a small laboratory in its facility in a room which is approximately 2 6'x2 6' (T. B3 6) The lab is used for testing wheat and flour samples.

Caustic soda and sulphuric acid are used in the lab to check the protein content of wheat. and flour. (T. B3 8)

One lab technician works in the room. (T. B36) The lab contains a small sink and a pullchain

type shower which is located approximately seven feet above the floor.

(T. A2 3; Ex. C) The room also contains an emergency eye-wash station which consists of a plastic squeeze bottle of buffer solution which is attached to

the %,,all together with instructions on its use. (T. A2 3,

Ex. A) The buffer solution neutralizes acid or base. The bottle was approximately seven eighths

full. (T. B3 7) The shower and the squeeze bottle were installed in 1973.

(T. B38) The room did not contain an emergency basin-type eye wash. (T. A23)

8. Mr. Wickman issued the citation because the believed that if an employee had corrosive material in his eyes, the shower would only push the material into the eyes rather than wash it out. Mr. Wickman concluded that the eye wash bottle did not provide enough fluid for an adequate eye wash since a 15-minute supply of water is recommended. (T. A24)

A suitable facility for quick drenching of the eyes would include a basin-type device which projects a stream of water upward into the side of each eye as the employee holds his head down over the device with the water flow being controlled by a foot valve. An alternative is a hose which can be attached to a sink with a special shower-head which reduces the pressure. (T. A25)

9. The Manufacturing Chemists Association recommends that if even small amounts of sulfuric acid enters the eyes, that the eyes be, irrigated immediately with large amounts of water for a minimum of 15 minutes.

(Ex. 5;

T. B14 2) The National- Safety Council's "Fundamentals
of Industrial Hygiene"
recommends thorough flushing of the eyes with copious
amounts of water and
states that neutralizing agents should not be used since
they may- increase eye
damage. xs. 6, 7; T. B144)

Citation No. 1, Items No. 4 and 11

10. Citation No. .1 Item No. 4, alleged a violation of Article 502-4(b) (2) of the National. Electrical Code which is incorporated into 29

C.F. R. 1910.309(a) . The citation described the violation as follows:
Failed to provide flexible conduit that was not broken and with approved termination fittings for Class II, Division 2, areas as follows:

- (a) broken conduit on the blower motor located in the packing room
- (b) broken flexible conduit and non-approved termination fittings on the patient (sic) flour scale motor located on the sifter floor

broken metal flexible conduit and non-approved termination fittings for the conduit on the patient (sic) flour scale motor located (on the third floor of the mill.

Citation No. . 1, Item No. 11 described the violation as follows:

Failed to provide flexible conduit that was not damaged, as follows:

- (a) conduit was broken back of the termination fitting on the power shovel motor located in the elevator scale room
- (b) flexible conduit was broken back of the termination fitting on the auger drive motor located in the basement of the elevator.

11. At the time of the inspection, a flexible conduit which covered electrical wires coming into the blower motor located in the packing room was broken just behind the packing nut for the termination fitting. (T. A46, 75)
Flexible conduit is a metal tubing capable of bending which houses electrical wiring and can be employed around corners or short bends. Some conduit has a rubber insulation inside the metal casing (T. A73; Ex. D) and same conduit has a plastic coating on the outside of the metal casing. (D., . E, T. A7 4, B4 3)
On e purpose of The conduit is to keep dust from contact with the electrical wiring. (T. A4 5-46) Unless the insulation was also broken, dust would not come in contact with the wiring. (T. B41) The insulation under the conduit cited was not broken, however. (T. A85-86) Should dust enter the conduit but

not the insulation, it may prevent 'heat from the wiring from dissipating.

(T. A104, B69) There was approximately one-half inch of dust on top of the junction box of the blower motor in the packing room. The junction box is located on the back side of the motor where the wires exit from the motor and joins the electrical service coming into the motor. (T. A46-47)

12. On the sifter floor of the mill, there was a broken flexible conduit and non approved termination fittings which were not dust right on the patent flour scale motor. The insulation inside the conduit was not broken.

(T. B43) There was a light film of dust on the floor but no concentrations in the air. (T. A4 7)

13. There was also a broken metal flexible conduit with a non-approved, not dust-tight, termination fitting on the patent flour scale motor located on the third floor of the mill. (T. A47) The insulation inside the conduit was not broken. (T. B43)

14. There is a power shovel motor located in the elevator scale room of the Respondent's facility. The flexible conduit attached to the motor was broken just back of the termination fitting. (T. A48, A83, B46) The insulation under the conduit cited was not broken, however. (T. AB 5-8 6)

15. There was also a broken flexible conduit on the auger drive motor located in the basement of the elevator. The conduit was broken back of the termination fitting and was not dust-tight. (T. A4 8, B4 7) The insulation under the conduit cited was not broken, however. (T. A85 86)

There was a concentration of dust in the air at the time of the inspection due to a spill from one of the spouts. (T. A5 0, B5 9) The broken conduit can be fixed by replacing it or shortening it up to eliminate the broken portion. (T. A4 9)

16. The unadjusted penalty for any particular violation is calculated by rating the hazard on the scale of A to F for severity, and by a consideration of the probability of an accident by an examination of six factors. The investigator assigns points for probability in the following six areas: He considers first, whether or not there is employee exposure to the hazard; second,

he considers the proximity of the employee to the hazard; third, he rates the duration of the hazard; fourth, he rates the working conditions of the facility-, fifth he rates the type of injury, and last, he assigns a number for employee control which means whether or not the employee contributed to the unsafe working condition. (T. B20, 23) The maximum probability points are

ten. The severity rating (e.g., C = \$40) is then multiplied by the probability rating to get the unadjusted penalty.

17. All of the unadjusted penalties proposed in the two citations at issue were reduced for credit given for the factors of good faith, size and history of the Respondent. The investigator gave the Respondent a maximum of 30% reduction for good faith since they have a safety program and are active in safety matters concerning their employees and enforce safety rules. Be-

cause Conagra has more than 100 employees, the investigator gave no reduction in the penalties for the size of the company. The Respondent was allotted the maximum 10% for past history. All of the penalties were then reduced by 40%.

(T. B18)

18. In calculating the penalty for Item ND. 4 of Citation No. 1, the severity was rated at C by the investigator since a potential injury would result in some lost time or perhaps doctors' treatment. The probability was rated at a 3 since the investigator scored points in the area of employee exposure, proximity of the hazard and employee control. The C rating is assigned a \$40.00 penalty which is then multiplied by the 3 rating for an unadjusted penalty of \$120.00. (T. B2 0-21) The 40% credit for good faith and history leaves a \$72.00 penalty proposed for this item. (T. B22)

Citation No. 2, Items Nos. 2 and 7

19. This portion of the citation alleges a violation of the National

Electrical Code, Article 502-4(b) (1), which is incorporated into 29 C.F.R.

1910.309(a) The citation alleged that the standard was violated as follows:

Failed to provide junction boxes that are approved for class II, Division 2, areas as follows:

- (a) junction boxes for lights located in the packing room
- (b) non-approved junction box located on the north wall of the packing room
- (c) no cover on the junction box for the filter motor located on the west side of the fifth floor of the cleaning house

- (d) non-approved junction boxes for ceiling lights located on the 5th floor of the cleaning house
- (e) norraproved junction boxes for the ceiling lights located on the f if th floor of the mill

- (f) non-approved junction boxes for ceiling lights located on the fourth floor of the mill
- (g) twelve non-approved junction boxes for ceiling lights located on the third floor of the mill
- (h) twenty-two non-approved junction boxes for ceiling lights located on the second floor of the mill
- (i) non-approved junction boxes for lights located in the galley at the top of the metal bins
- (j) non-approved junction boxes for lights located at the top of the elevator
- (k) elevator driveway dump area (3 non-approved junction boxes located on the wall)

Failed to provide junction boxes that are approved for Class II, Division 1, areas as follows:

- (a) non-approved junction boxes for ceiling lights located in the west tunnel below the steel bins.
- (b) non-approved junction boxes for ceiling lights located in the basement of the elevator.

20 CY the date of the inspection, the junction boxes for lights located

in the packing room were not dust-tight. (Exs. F, G; T. B103) A junction box

is the enclosure through which the wiring passes Before proceeding through

conduit to a light fixture. Some junction boxes would not contain joints or

terminal connections. The investigator did not open the junction boxes to

examine them. (T. A91-92) If a junction box is properly wired and maintained

it would not normally produce sparks. (T. A.100-101, B92) 'The junction boxes

cited were not dust-tight in that they had knockouts on the sides; they bad

open screw holes, and they did not have threaded 'bosses. (T. A51) A knockout

is a metal disc in die junction box which can easily be knocked out with a

screw driver to permit the entrance of rigid conduit. (T. A52) If the knock-

outs are in tact, however, dust cannot enter through them. (T. A95-96 A

threaded boss is an opening on the side of the junction box with threads which

permits the conduit to be screwed into The junction box so as to keep it

dust-tight. (T. A53) The junction boxes in the packing room had no threaded

boss. Instead, the conduit entered the junction box through a knockout and

'held with a nut on each side of the junction box. (T. A54)

21. Another junction box on the north wall of the packing room was not dust-tight in that it had knockouts and screw opening consisting of an elongated slot which would leave a hole even though the screw is tightened.

(T. A55-56; Ex. H) The junction box also lacked a threaded boss. (T. A5 5)

There was some dust located on the motor in the packing room and some dust on

one junction 'boxes on the wall. (T. A54)

22. A junction box for the filter motor which is located on the west side

of the fifth floor of the cleaning house was missing a cover.

The wiring,

which was connected with plastic screw caps was sticking out of the junction

box. (T. A56) The motor was being repaired at the time of the inspection.

(T. B52) The cleaning house is located in the mill area. (T. A56)

23. The junction boxes for the ceiling lights located on the fifth floor

of the cleaning house were not dust-tight in that they lacked

threaded bosses,

had knockouts on the sides of the box, and open screw holes on the face

plate. (T. A57)

24. The ceiling lights located on the fifth floor of the flour mill had

junction boxes which were not dust-tight in that they lacked

threaded bosses,

had knockouts and screw holes in the face plate. (T. A57--58) There were no

concentrations of dust in the air.

However, light dust had

accumulated

throughout the mill. (T. A58)

25. The junction boxes for the ceiling lights located on the fourth floor

of the flour mill were not dust-tight in that they had conduits

fastened with

a nut instead of threaded bosses; there were knockouts in the junction box and

screw holes in the face plate. Knockouts can be easily removed and are often

either loose or knocked out altogether. (T. A58; Ex. I)

26. On the third floor of the flour mill, 12 of the junction boxes for

the ceiling lights were not dust-tight in that they contained

knockouts, did

not have threaded bosses, and had screw holes in the face plate. (T. A59)

27. On the second floor of the flour mill, there were 22 junction boxes

for ceiling lights which were not dust-tight in that they did
not have
threaded bosses, had knockouts and contained screw holes in the
face plate.
An employee works one-half to three-quarters Tours per day in the
area of
these lights. (T. A5 9)

28. Five junction boxes for ceiling lights located in the gallery at the top of the metal bins were not dust-tight in that they had holes in the face plate, no threaded bosses, and knockouts. The gallery is the metal enclosure at the top of the bins which houses the horizontal auger which transfers grain through spouts down into the metal bins. There was light dust in this area.

(T. A60)

29. In the headhouse located at the top of the elevator, there are five lights with junction boxes which are not dust-tight in that they had holes in the face plate, no threaded bosses, and contained knockouts. The headhouse contains the top of the legs and pulleys. (T. A60-61)

30. The elevator driveway dump area, which is the receiving area where the grain is dumped into floor grates from trucks, contained three junction boxes on the walls which were not dust-tight in that they did not have threaded bosses, had knockouts and had holes in the face plate. One employee works in this area one to two hours per day. There was a light concentration of grain dust. (T. A61)

31. In the west tunnel below the steel bins, the ceiling lights lacked dust-tight junction boxes. The junction boxes had knockout, and holes in the face plates and did not have screw connectors for the conduit. The west tunnel connects to the basement of the elevator and contains a horizontal auger for the transfer of grain. The area is adjacent to an area where a spill had been observed. However, the area itself was fairly clean. (T. A62)

32. In the basement of the elevator, there were six ceiling lights that had junction boxes which had knockouts with no threaded bosses and screw holes in the face plate. On the day of the inspection, there was a spill of grain from one of the spouts in the basement of the elevator. The closest junction box to the spill was eight feet away and the farthest one was 20 feet.

(T. ES 9)

33. All except two of the junction boxes areas cited in Items 2 and 7 involved ceiling locations. In the packing room, the ceiling is 25 to 30 feet high and in the flour mill, the ceilings range from 12 to 20 feet. (T. B4 9)

The screw holes in the junction boxes on the ceiling face downward. (T. B49)

34. A penalty was proposed for Item No. 2 of Citation No. 2. The in-vestigator rated the severity, at E since he concluded that an accident would be rather severe in that a fire or explosion could result in second or

third-degree burns and a possible death. The investigator assigned a rating

of 4 for Probability by assigning three points for employee exposure, prox-

imity to the hazard, and employee control. It assigned a fourth point because

there were 11 instances of the violation. (T. E26) Since an E rating trans-

lates to \$32.00, the resulting unadjusted penalty was \$32.00. The applica-

tion of the 40% credit resulted in a Proposed penalty of \$12.80.

Citation N:). 2, Item No. 3.

3 5. C, citation NC). 2, Item No. 3, alleges a violation of the 1971 National

Electrical- Code at Article 502-13(b) as it is incorporated into 29 C.F.R.

1910.309(a) - The citation described the alleged violation as follows:

Filed to provide receptacles and attachment plugs that are approved for Class II, Division 2, areas as follows:

- (a) two-plex receptacle located on the south wall of the packing room
- (b) attachment plug for the electric chain hoist: located on the fifth floor of the mill
- (c) two-plex outlet located on the south wall of the roll floor
- (d) non-approved attachment plug for the moisture tester located on the south wall of the roll floor
- (e) non-approved attachment plug for the sifter located by the south wall of the roll floor.

36. On the south wall of the packing room, directly below a junction box and light, is a two-plex electrical outlet or receptacle. The receptacle had a spring-loaded cover. At the time of the inspection, a clock was plugged into the outlet that held the cover open. Although the outlet had a cover, it is a spring-operated piece of equipment and is not dust-tight. (T. A64) A

dust-tight receptacle operates so that insertion of the attachment
plug into
the socket seals the area and the plug then has to be twisted in order
to make
contact with the source of electricity. (T. P65, B102; Dc. 3)
'There was a
concentration of dust in the packing room on the fixtures and
the floor
(T. A-9 7)

37. An attachment plug for the electric chain hoist located on
the fifth
floor of the mill was not of the type approved for a dust-tight
location.

(T. A67) The plug was plugged in and available for use. (lie employee works in this area about a half-hour per day. There was a light film of dust in the area. (T. A68, 103, E55)

38. On the south wall of the roll floor, there is a 1--@plex outlet or receptacle which was not dust-tight and is a spark-producing piece of equipment. P. moisture tester was plugged into the outlet. The roll floor contains machines used in the flour manufacturing process. 'Iahe ro.'Ll floor area was clean of dust although leaks are possible at times. (T. A68)

39. The moisture tester sbicti @s plugged into the outlet described in the preceding paragraph was attached by means of an attachment plug which is not of the type approved for dust-tight areas. (T. A68)

40. The sifter was also plugged into the outlet on the south wall of the roll floor, and it was connected with an attachment plug not approved for dust-tight locations. (T. A69)

41. 'The hazard which exists in regard to junction boxes is that if there is a concentration of dust in the box or conduit, it (-@d create or add to a fire or explosion. A short or a sparking could set the dust on fire and this could travel the length of the conduit. (T. A70) The @ant plugs and receptacles create a small spark when used, and if there is any accumulated dust in the area., a fire or explosion could be caused (T. P69)

42. A penalty was proposed for Item No. 3 of Citation 1b. 2. The investigator rated the severity at an E because of the possibility of burns and cuts from an explosion or fire. He rated the probability at a 3 by assigning points in the categories of employee exposure, proximity to the hazard, and employee control. Because the E rating is assigned an E0.00 value, the total unadjusted penalty was \$240.00. This was then reduced by the 40% credit for good faith and history which resulted in a proposed penalty of \$144.00. (T. B28)

Citation 1, Item No. 5, - 29 C. F. R. 1910. 68(c) (5) (i i i)

43. Item No. 5 of Citation No. 1 alleged a violation of 29 C.F.R.

1910.68(c!) (5) (i ii) and described the alleged violation as follows:

Fliled to set the brake so that when the step passes over the limit switch the step will stop within 24 inches of the terminal landi ng on the 5th f loor f or the manlif t located i n the cleaning nouse

44. An endless belt manlift is a vertical belt which runs between several floors of a facility and provides transportation for a person from one level to another. The belt contains a series of steps which the rider can mount in order to travel either up or down (T. A105-106, Ex. L) The manlift located at Respondent's facility traveled from the basement to the top of the elevator. The belt is approximately 12 inches wide. Each rider holds on to the belt by grabbing a cup located at chest level above the step, and steps off of the belt when he reaches the floor which is his destination. The speed of the belt is predetermined. The rider has access to an emergency stop switch which

j
is a rope located at the side of the belt. (T. A107)

45. A limit switch is located 24 inches above the opening on the top floor. The purpose of the limit switch is to stop the belt when a step reaches it if there is a person's weight on the step when the switch is passed. Without the switch, an employee could proceed over the top of the belt and fall to the floor on the other side. (T. A109) On the date of the inspection, the inspector stepped onto the manlift at the top floor, but the limit switch failed to stop the belt. Instead, the belt coasted to a stop approximately six feet above the top floor. (T. A108-110) The inspector did not ride the lift up from the lower floor to see if the switch would work properly. (T. A126-27) The inspector talked to the plant manager after the inspection and the plant manager stated that he had adjusted the brake so that it was stopping at the right point. (T. A110)

46. With regard to the proposed penalty, the investigator rated the severity of a potential accident at a C4 which means that injury could result in some lost time or doctor treatment but not a long-term hospital stay. He rated the probability of an injury at 3 by giving a point for the areas of employee exposure, proximity to hazard and employee control. Since a C rating equals 440.00, the total unadjusted penalty was \$120.00. This was then reduced by a 40% credit which left the proposed penalty of \$72.00. (T. B23)

Citation @). 1, Item No. 6 - 29 C.F. R. 1910.68(b) (11) (ii) (a)
47. nie violation of 29 C.F.R. 1910.68(b) (11) (ii) (a@)
alleged at Cita-
tion No. 1, Item 6, was described in the citation as follows:
@iled to provide at least five feet head clearance between the
center of the head pulley shaft and any ceiling obstruction at
the top of the manlif t located in the cleaning house.

48. The distance between the center of the head pulley shaft located at the top of the belt manlift and the ceiling of the cleaning house is 33 inches. The purpose of providing a five-foot clearance is to protect a rider who was heading towards the top of the belt after the failure of the limit switch. (T. All-112) The investigator suggested three methods of connecting the problem: (1) raise the ceiling; (2) take the top floor out of service, - and (3) apply for a variance. (T. A127)

Citation No. 1, Item No. 7 - 29 C. F. R. 1910.68(b) (10) (iv)

49. Item No. 7 of Citation No. 1 alleges a violation of 29 C.F.R.

1910.68(b) (10) (iv) and described the alleged violation as follows:

Failed to provide guard rails with a staggered railing or self-closing gates to guard against a person getting under the ascending step on the manlift located in the cleaning house basement.

50. The lower end of the belt manlift is anchored in the basement of the cleaning house. In the area of the basement where the manlift is located, there are two doors in close proximity to the manlift. Because between the doors would take a passerby near the manlift. The manlift is unguarded in that there is no railing or gates which would prevent a passerby from coming into contact with the manlift. The hazard involved would be the danger of an employee being struck by a step, either on the descending or ascending side of the manlift should he come into contact with it. (T. k 12 -1 13 4)

Citation No. 2, Item No. 5 - 29 C.F. R- 1910.68(b) (8) (i)

51. Item 5 of Citation No. 2 alleges a violation of 29 C.F.R.

1910.68(b) (8) (i) and describes the violation as follows:

Failed to protect the entrance and the exit to the manlift from the maintenance platform located between the first and second floor of the cleaning house with staggered guard rails or by a self-closing gate.

52. The maintenance platform is located adjacent to the manlift between the

first and second floors of the cleaning house. The platform is approximately

10 feet from the ground. (T. A141) 'nMe platform at the entrance lacks a

guardrail or a maze or a swinging gate. 'Me hazard would be the possibility

of falling or of being hit by a step on the manlift should an euplayee lean

c-,t from the opening where it is not guarded. (T. A114-115) 'The condition could be abated with a swinging gate. The platform is used by a maintenance person once a week. (T. A1 17, 131) The manlift was in use by employees on the day of inspection. (T. A118)

53. A penalty was proposed for Item No. 5 of Citation No. 2. The severity of a potential injury was rated at D because if there was a fall, it would be one of approximately ten feet which could result in a broken arm or a similar injury. The investigator rated the probability at a 3 by assigning points in the categories of employee exposure, proximity to the hazard, and employee knowledge. Since a D is assigned a \$50.00 value, the resulting unadjusted penalty was \$180.00. This was then reduced by the 25% credit for good faith and past history which resulted in a final proposed penalty of \$108.00.

54. In June of 1971 the Respondent's Minneapolis mill was advised by the federal OSHA program that they interpreted 1910-68(b) (3) to mean that the design requirements of 1910.68 apply only to man-lifts installed after the effective date of the standard. (Ex. K; 97. B12 3) (In January 31, 1978, the federal OSHA program issued a program directive which sought to clarify when the general duty clause should be used, when 29 C. F. R. - 1910.68 is inapplicable because the manlift in question was installed prior to August 27, 1971, the effective date of the standard. (Ex. J) @ the Department of Labor and I@huso, has interpreted 1910.68(b) (3) to mean that older elevators need not meet the ANSI design requirements, but must meet the OSHA requirements of

1910.68. The Department has been issuing citations consistent with its interpretation for the past several years. (T. A139)

Citation No. 2, Item 1 @ 29 C. F. R. 1910.309(a)

55. Item No. 1 of Citation No. 2 alleges a violation of the 1971 OSHA

Electrical Code, Article 110-17 (a), as incorporated into 29 C.F.R.

1910.309(a) - 'The violation was described as follows:

Failed to guard live parts of electrical equipment operating at

50 volts or more, as follows:

(a) electric panel located in the lab.

56. The electrical panel is located in the lab room on the south wall 1

220 volts of current come into the electrical panel. At the time
of the fire--

The top half of the panel inside the door was missing,
leaving an

open area of approximately 11. x 12 inches which 'nad the wiring and contacts exposed. (O A143; Ex. A) The panel contains circuit breakers. (T. A15 4)
The door w@as closed on the panel at the time of the inspection. (T. A14 6)
One employee works in the lab. Normally, the only people opening the panel would be electricians installing -a new circuit. (T. B7 3) 9he one employee would not normally have a reason to use the panel (T. B74), but the circuit breakers for the lab are contained in the panel (T. E75), as are the circuit breakers for the office area. (T. - B7.8) @ould an employee come in contact with the e.@sed,area of the panel,- an electrical burn or electrocution would be possible. (T. A145)

57. A penalty was proposed for Item No. 1 of Citation RD. 2. The invea- tagator rated the severity of the potential injury at an E !since he concluded Enat an accident would be quite severe. He only assigned one point for proba- oility in the area of employee control. Since an E rating equals \$80.00, this was the resulting unadjusted penalty. This was then multiplied by the 4c% credi t and the proposed penalty arrived at t48.00.

Citation NTc). 2, Item%. 6 - Minn. Stat. 182.653, subd. 2

5 8. Item No. 6 of Citation No. 2 alleges a violation of the general duty

clause contained at Minn. Stat. 152.653, subd. 2, and described the viola-

tion as follows:

Ehplono failed to furniti to each of his employees conditions of employment and a place of employment free from recognized hazards that were causing or were likely to cause death or serious injury to his employees; specifically, employer failed to provide guard rails at the top of the metal bins from tr,e galley (sic) emergency exit to the caged fixed ladder that is used as a second means of egress, and to lprovide at guardrailed platform between the bins.

59. Ranning across the top of the steel bins is a metal enclosure called a gallery 'which houses a boriawaal auger with spouts attached v4A(la enter eadn bin for transfer of the product. The metal bins are standing approxi-

notely 6 to 8 inches apart from each other at the closest point and the top of the bins are slightly sloped. (T. B5, 78) The gallery 'has an emergency exit door at its end with a small platform. A fixed caged ladder is attached to the last bin and extends 3 feet to 42 inches above the roofline of the bin. In order to cross from the gallery exit to the caged fixed ladder in the event

of an emergency, an employee would have to travel across the opening between two bins. The opening has no guardrailed platform nor are there any guardrails on the top of the metal bins. (T. B6) The distance from the gallery exit door to the fixed ladder is approximately 15 to 20 feet. (T. BB) No employees regularly work in this area, but it would be used for maintenance as emergency exit. (T. B13-14) A walkway did exist between two of the other bins in the line. (T. B8) Other grain elevators have employed cables running from a gallery to fixed ladders or guardrails. (T. B9-10) The investigator was aware of three other grain facilities with similar cables or guardrails, but admitted that others did not have such guardrails. (T. B16)

60. P, proposed penalty was calculated for the general duty clause violation in item No. 6 of Citation No. 2. The investigator assigned an F rating for severity because if an employee fell from the roof level to the ground, the accident would be fatal. The probability factor was rated at only 1 for the category of employee control however, since there would be a low number of people who would be exposed to such an accident. (T. B29) Since the F is assigned a value of 100.00, that was the resulting unadjusted penalty. After applying the 40% credit, the resulting final proposed penalty was 160.00.

Based upon the foregoing findings of fact, the hearing officer makes the following:

CONCLUSIONS OF THE BOARD

1. That the Minnesota Occupational Safety and Health Review Board and the Hearing Officer have jurisdiction herein and authority to take the action proposed pursuant to Minn. Stat. 182.661, subd. 3, 182.664, and 15.052, subd. 3 (1980).

2. That the Board gave proper notice of this hearing and that the plaintiff and the Board have fulfilled all relevant substantive and procedural requirements of law and rule.

3. That the Respondent is an employer as defined by Minn. Stat. 182.651, subd. 7 (1980).

4. 29 C.F.R. 1910-151 (c) provides that:
Where the eye or body of any person may be exposed to injurious corrosive materials, suitable facilities for quick drenching or

flushing of the eyes and body shall be provided within the
work area for immediate emergency use.

5. That the Respondent was in violation of 29 C.F.R. 1910.151(c) on the date of inspection.

6. 'Die lbtional Electrical Code (Ngl 1971 at Article 502-4, as incor-

porated into 29 C.F.R. 1910.309(a) , provides as follows:

502-4. 'Wiring methods. Wiring methods shall conform to the following:

(a) Class II, Division 1. In Class II, Division 1 locations, threaded rigid metal conduit or Type M1 cable with termination fittings approved for the location shall be the wiring method employed. Type M1 cable shall be installed and supported in a manner to avoid tensile stress at the termination fittings.

(1) Fittings and Boxes. Elongated and 'boxes shall be provided with threaded bosses for connection to conduit or cable terminations, shall have close fitting covers, and shall have no openings (such as holes for attachment-screws) through which dust might enter, or through which sparks or burning material might escape. Fittings and boxes in which taps, joints or terminal connections are made, or which are used in locations where dusts are of an electrically conducting nature shall be dust-ignition proof and approved for Class II locations.

(2) Flexible Connections. Where necessary to employ flexible connections, dust-tight flexible connectors, flexible metal conduit with approved fittings, liquidtight flexible metal conduit with approved fittings, or flexible cord approved for extra-hazard usage and provided with bushed fittings shall be used, except that where dusts are of an electrically conducting nature, flexible metal conduit shall not be used, and flexible cords shall be provided with dust-tight seals at both ends. An additional conductor for grounding shall be provided in the flexible cord unless other acceptable means of grounding is provided there flexible connections are subject to oil or other corrosive conditions, the insulation of the conductors shall be of a type approved for the condition or shall be protected by means of a suitable sheath.

(b) Class II, Division 2. In Class II, Division 2 locations, rigid metal conduit, electrical metallic tubing, or Type 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100 cable with approved termination fittings or dust-tight wireways shall be the wiring method employed.

(1) Wireways, Fittings and Boxes. Wireways, fittings and boxes in which taps, joints or terminal connections are made, shall be designed to minimize the entrance of dust, and: (1) shall be provided with telescoping or close fitting covers, or other effective means to prevent the escape of sparks or

burning material, and (2) shall have no openings (such as holes

for attachment screws) through which, after installation, sparks or burning material might escape, or through which adjacent combustible material might be ignited.

(2) Flexible Connections. Where flexible connections are necessary the provisions of Section 502-4(a) (2) shall apply.

7. Class II locations are defined by the INBC at Article 500-5 as follows:

500-5. Class II Locations. Class II locations are those which are hazardous because of the presence of combustible dust. Class II locations shall include the following:

(a) Class II, Division 1. Locations (1) in which combustible dust is or may be in suspension in the air continuously, intermittently, or periodically under normal operating conditions, in quantities sufficient to produce explosive or ignitable mixtures (2) where mechanical failure (or abnormal operation of machinery or equipment might cause such mixtures to be produced, and might also provide a source of ignition through simultaneous failure of electrical equipment, operation of protection devices or from other causes, or (3) in which dusts of an electrically conducting nature may be present

[This classification usually includes the work areas of grain handling and storage plants; rooms containing grinders or pulverizers, cleaners, graders, scalpers, open conveyors; or rooms, (In bins or hoppers, mixers or blenders, automatic or hopper scales, packing machinery, elevator heads and boots, stock Distributors, dust and stock collectors (except all-metal collectors vented to the outside), and all similar dust producing machinery and equipment: in grain processing plants, starch plants, sugar pulverizing plants, malting plants, hay grinding plants, and other occupancies of similar nature; coal pulverizing plants (except where the pulverizing equipment is essentially dusttight); all mixing areas where metal dusts and powders are produced, processed, handled, packed or stored (except in tight containers); and all other similar locations where combustible dust may, under normal operating conditions, be present in the air in quantities sufficient to produce explosive or ignitable mixtures.

Combustible dusts which are electrically non-conducting include dusts produced in the handling and processing of grain and grain products, pulverized sugar and cocoa, dried egg and milk powders, dulcified spices, starch and pastes, potato and wheat flour, oil meal from beans and seed, dried bay, and other organic materials which may produce combustible dusts when processed or handled. Electrically (-, non-

ducting nonmetallic dusts include dusts from E)ul-
verized coal, coke and charcoal. Dusts containing
magnesium r aluminum are particularly Ivizardoas and
every precaution must be taken to avoid ignition and
explosions

(b) Class II, Division 2. locations in which combustible
dust will not normally 'ne in suspension in tne air, or will not
be likely to be thrown into suspension by the normal operation
of eqkpnent or apparatus, in quantities sufficient to produce
explosive or ignitable mixtures, but (1) where deposits or ao-
cumulal--ions of such dust may loe sufficient to interfere with the
safe dissipation of 'heat from electrical equipment or apparatus,
or (2) where such deposits or accumulations of dust on, in, or
in the vicinity of eleoxical equipment might Ix? ignited 10,
arcs, sparks or burning material from such equipment.

[Locations where dangerous concentrations of sug-
P(anded dust would rxdt be likely, but where dust ac!cu-
mulations might form on, or in the vicinity of e:Lec-
t.rical equipment, would include rooms and areas c,,on-
taining only closed spouting and conveyors, closed
bins or hoppers, or machines and equipment from Mich
appreciable quantities of dust would escape only under
abnormal operating conditions; rooms or areas adjacent
to locations des=Abed in Section 500-5(a) , and into
which explosive or ignitable concentrations of s;us-
pended dust mi@t be communicated only under abnormal
operating conditions; rooms or areas where the foi-ma-
tion of explosive or ignitable concentrations of .3u@
pended dust is prevented by the operation of effective
dust control equipment, warehouses and shippi@ room
where dust r-roducting materials are stored (Dr 'handled
only in bags or containers; and other similar 1(:)ca-
t ion s. I

S. That the Respondent was in violation of NE)C 1971, ;xticle 502-
4(b) (2)

(Dn the date of inspection. @

9. That the \$72.00 penalty proposed by the Complainant is
appropriate and

reflects a consideration of the factors set out at Minn. Stat.
182.666,

s ubd. 6.

10. Moat the Respondent was in violation of NE)C 1971, l@ticle 502-
4(b) (1)

on eie date of inspection.

11. 'rnat the violation of Article 502-4(b) (1) is serious
within the

meaning of Minn. Stat. 182.651, subd. 12.

12. '!'hat the \$192-00 penalty proposed by the; Complainant is;
appropriate

mid reflects a consideration of the factors set out at Minn. Stat
182.666,

s ubd. 6.

13. NEC 1971, Article 502-13, as incorporated into
29 C. F. R.

1910. 309(a) , provides as follows:

502-13. Receptacles and Attachment Plugs.

(a) Class II, Division 1. In Class II, Division 1 locations, receptacles and attachment plugs shall be of the type providing for connection to the grounding conductor of the flexible cord, and it shall be dust-ignition proof approved for Class II locations.

(1) Class II, Division 2. In Class II, Division 2 locations, receptacles and attachment plugs shall be of the type providing for connection to the grounding conductor of the flexible cord and it shall be so designed that connection to the supply circuit cannot be made or broken while live parts are exposed.

14. That the Respondent was in violation of NEC 1971, Article 502-13(b) ,

on the date of inspection.

15. That the violation is serious within the meaning of Minn. Stat.

182.651, subd. 12.

16. That the penalty of \$144.00 proposed by Complainant is appropriate

and reflects a consideration of the factors set out at Minn. Stat. 182-666,

subd. 6.

17. That 29 C. F. R. 1910. 68(c) (5) (iii) provides as follows:

Cutoff initial limit stop switch device shall function so that the manlift will be stopped before the loaded step has reached a point 24 inches above the top terminal landing.

18. That the Complainant has failed to prove by a preponderance of the

evidence that Respondent was in violation of 29 C.F.R. 191.0.68(c) (5) (iii) on

the date of inspection.

19. That the penalty of \$72.00 proposed by Complainant is appropriate and

reflects a consideration of the factors set out at Minn. Stat.
1B2.666,

subd. 6.

20. That 29 C.F.R. 1910.68(b) (11) (ii)(a) provides as follows:

Pulley clearance. (a) 'Nere Kudl be a clearance of at
leasi-5 f eet between the center of the head pulley shaft@ and any
ceiling obstruction.

21. That the Respondent was in violation Of 29 C.F.]R.
1910.68(b) (11)

(i i) (a) on the date of the inspection.

22. 2@) C.F.R. 1910.68(b) (10) (iv) provides as follows:

Guardrails. MD guard against persons walking under a desce@hiing step, the area on the downside of the manlift shall be guarded in accordance with sOTmrag7alii (8) of this paragraph. Tb guard against a person getting betveeeri Uie mounting platform and an ascending step, the area between the belt and Une platform shall be protected by a guardrail.

29 C. F. P- 1910.68(b) (8) (i) provides as follows:

Guardrail requirement. The entrances and exit at all floor landings affording access to the manlift shall be guarded by a maze (staggered railing) or a handrail equipped with self-closing gates.

23. @at the Respondent was in violation of 29 (nF% R. 1910-68(b) (10) (iv) on the date of the inspection.

24. 'Diat the Respondent was riot in violation of 29 C.F.R. 1910.68(b) (8) (i) on the date of inspection.

25. 'niat Article 110-17 of the liBC 1971 as incorporated into 29 C.F.R. 1910.309(a) provides as follows:

110-17. Guarding of LLve Parts. (lbt more than 600 Volts)

(a) Except as elsewhere required or permitted by this Code, live parts of electrical equipment operating at 50 volts or more shall be guarded against accidental c6ntact by approved cabinets cDr other forms of approved enclosures, or any of the following means:

(1) By location in a room, vault, or similar enclosure which is accessible only to qualified persons.

(2) By suitable permanent, substantial partitions or screens so arranged that only- qualified persons will have access to the space within reach of the live parts. Any openings in such partitions or screens Nodl be so sized and located that persons are not likely to come into accidental contact witli the live parts or to bring conducting objects into contact with them.

(3) By location on a suitable balcony, gallery, or platform so elevated and arranged as to exclude unqualified persons.

(4) By elevation at least 8@eet above the floor or other working surface.

(b) Ili locations where electrical equipment would be ex-Fosed to #laical damage, enclosures or guards shall be so arranged and of such strength as to prevent such damage.

(c) Each of the storage rooms and other guarded locations containing used live parts shall be marked with conspicuous warning signs forbidding unqualified persons to enter.

26. That the Respondent was in violation of Article 110-17(a) of the NBC 1971 on the date of inspection.

27. That the violation was serious within the meaning of Minn. Stat.

182.651, subd. 12.

28. That the penalty of \$48-00 proposed by the Complainant is appropriate

and reflects a consideration of the factors set out at Minn. Stat.

182.666,

subd. 6.

29. That the violations of the standards cited above also constitute a

violation of Minn. Stat. 182.653, subd. 3.

30. Minn. Stat. 182-653, subd. 2, provides as follows:

Each employer shall furnish to each of his employees conditions of employment free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious injury or harm to his employees.

31. That the Complainant has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent was in violation of Minn. Stat. 182.653, subd.

2, on the date of inspection by reason of its failure to provide guardrails at

the top of its metal bins and a guardrailed platform between the bins.

32. That the Complainant has failed to prove that the absence of a guard-

rail and platform atop the metal bins in question is a hazard recognized with-

in the grain milling industry.

33. The installation of guardrails and a guardrailed platform is a feasible safety measure.

34. No specific Minnesota statute exists which would apply to the situation

referred to in Conclusions NDs. 31 and 32.

35. That the above Conclusions are based upon the reasons set out in the Memorandum which follows and which is incorporated by reference.

Based upon the foregoing Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Examiner makes the following:

ORDER

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT:

1 - That the citations and penalties cited in Conclusions Nos-
co &-12,
14-16, 21, 23, and 26-28 are hereby affirmed.

2. That the citations and penalties cited in Conclusions NDs. 18,
19, 24,
and 31-34 are hereby dismissed.

3. That the Respondent CorAgra, Inc. shall forthwith pay to the
Commissioner of Labor and Industry the sum of \$456.00.

Dated: August 1981.

CEO
State Hearing Examiner

MEMORANDUM

The issue to be resolved in regard to the equipment located in
the lab
room is whether or not the equipment constituted "suitable
facilities for
(4, c. 151B) < drenching or flushing of the eyes for immediate emergency
use".
The Complainant maintained a bottle of neutralizing solution, a sink
and a
shower in the lab room. The evidence submitted by the Complainant has demon-
strated that a neutralizing solution is not a suitable item of equipment
to be
used for chemical burns of the eyes involving sulfuric acid. The
literature
states that a neutralizing agent may, in fact, increase the eye
damage.
Neither would a 12-ounce bottle provide very much liquid for flushing
the eyes
even if it had contained a proper solution. The overhead pull chain
shower
located in the lab would ordinarily be used in the case of a chemical
burn of
the body - The testimony, of the investigator is logically
persuasive in
reasoning that if an employee leaned back to allow the shower
to fall into his
eyes, the corrosive material might very well be retained in the eyes
rather
than flushed out. Maintaining such a posture and keeping the
eyes open
against falling water would obviously be difficult.

The sink alone would not provide an adequate remedy in the case of eye damage. If the sink been equipped with a hose which would reduce pressure so that it could be used for flushing the eyes, this would have been adequate. The sink alone, however, would not permit a single employee to flush his eyes. A portion of the literature suggested that pouring water from a clean container might be a suitable means of flushing the eyes as long as copious amounts of water were available. In the case of a lab situation where there is only one employee, however, this method is not feasible since the water would have to be carefully poured on to the bridge of the victim's nose by a second person.

The record herein establishes that one effective method for flushing the eyes would be the basin-type eye wash which projects a stream of water upward to each eye,

and which is operated with a foot pedal. An alternative would be a hose and nozzle device which could be attached to the sink and could be easily operated by one employee. The literature and the investigator's testimony make it clear that a large amount of water must be available for a flushing of the eyes which means at least a 15-minute supply. The Respondent complains that the 15-minute time limit is not contained in the standard itself and that it could, therefore, have known that this was required.

The standard does, however, require the Respondent to determine, in an objective manner, what are suitable facilities for flushing the eye. The Respondent cannot claim to simply rely upon its investigator's advice. A review of materials from manufacturers or National Safety Council literature would have given the Respondent the knowledge that its neutralizing solution was not a good answer to this problem and would have further informed him that copious amounts of water were necessary in order to successfully treat a chemical burn. Further reflection on how a single employee with a chemical burn would be able to successfully use a water supply might have caused the Respondent

to conclude that the shower and sink may have been adequate for burns on the body, but not for a chemical burn of the eye. 'The Respondent cannot aggregate three pieces of equipment in the lab room, which are each in themselves not completely effective, into one effective method.

In order to prove the electrical violations which the Complainant has alleged, it must first demonstrate that the electrical fixtures were located in a "Class 2, Division 2" area as defined by, the National Electrical Code.

As the definition set out in the Conclusion No. 7 indicates, a Class 2, Division 2 area is one in which dust will not normally be in suspension in the air, but where deposits or accumulations of such dust "may be sufficient to interfere with the safe dissipation of heat from electrical equipment or apparatus or (2) where such deposits or accumulations of dust on, in, or in the vicinity of electrical equipment might be ignited by arcs, sparks or burning material from such equipments. This definition can be contrasted with that set out for "Class 2, Division 1" which describes a location in which combustible dust is or may be in suspension in the air. The contents of the Code, which are not an enforceable part of the Code, indicate that the definition includes areas where dust accumulations might form near electrical equipment, but where appreciable quantities of dust would be abnormal.

The record demonstrates that the Respondent has a good housekeeping program which cleans up the dust which does accumulate in the facility and which takes care of spills which occur on occasion. The investigator was frank in describing the entire facility as fairly clean. However, the record is also clear that there was accumulated dust throughout the facility, that spills did occasionally occur and that some accumulation of dust was a normal incident of the operation of a grain handling facility and flour manufacturing mill. The findings also describe the investigator's observations of the accumulation of dust, generally described as a light film, in regard to the individual locations where the electrical equipment in question was located.

The Respondent is essentially arguing that since it maintains a good housekeeping program which normally permits only a light concentration of grain or flour dust in its facility that it, therefore, should not be included as a Class 2, Division 2 area. Such a position does not, however, square with the language of the NBC which speaks in terms of dust accumulations which "may be" sufficient or "tight" might be ignited by arcs or sparks. The Complainant is

not obligated to prove the existence of arcs, sparks or burning material or that the dust located in the Respondent's facility is, in fact, stible.

The thrust of the Class 2, Division 2 definition is to protect against abnormal occurrences such as an electrical fire which might ignite accumulated dust inside a junction box or a broken conduit. The Complainant can obviously not prove that such abnormal occurrences are or will occur in the Respondent's

facility. Mae Complainant has shown that there normally is a light dust located on equipment throughout the facility and that spills will occasionally, increase the concentration of dust. This showing, together with the description of the dust condition which the investigator encountered in regard to individual violations suffices to demonstrate that Class 2, Division 2 locations are involved within the meaning of the NEC.

Mae investigator found and cited five instances of broken flexible conduit which included two instances of nonapproved termination fittings. Mae Respondent argues in its defense that the fact that the conduit is broken or not tight-fitting does not present any hazard unless the insulation inside the conduit is also broken and the wiring therefore exposed. In each of the five instances cited by the investigator, the insulation was apparently not broken. Mae investigator testified, however, that an accumulation of dust inside the conduit but outside the insulation might prevent the heat from the electrical wiring from properly dissipating. It is also obvious, however, that one of the main purposes of flexible metal conduit is to protect the wiring from a blow of any kind. If the flexible metal conduit is broken or damaged, the wiring is then protected only by a strip of rubber insulation. The NEC cannot be read to approve the use of flexible conduit which is damaged or broken. If the conduit is unnecessary, it would not be required by the Code.

The citations in regard to the junction boxes cite 11 different locations - in One facility where the investigator believed that the junction boxes which were being used did not conform to the NEC requirements. The NEC requires that the junction box minimize the entrance of dust and shall not have any holes such as those for attachment screws. The junction boxes in question contain knockouts, however, the knockouts were all apparently in place. The investigator believed they were a problem because they could be easily removed. The junction boxes all contain screw holes which would permit the entrance of dust.

Altho the investigator did not open eadn junction box to determine that it contained taps, joints or terminal connections, he testified that some of the boxes .ould contain joints or terminal connections and some would possibly not. Mae Fespondent seeks to show that One junction boxes which are located

in ceiling locations do minimize the entrance of dust because of their location on the ceiling. The ceilings range from 12 to 30 feet from the floor.

Most screw holes are facing downward. In the absence of a malfunction, there would not normally be any sparks or arcs from the junction boxes.

Article 502-4(b) (1) provides, however, that in addition to minimizing the entrance of dust the boxes shall have no openings through which sparks might escape. The

junction boxes in question clearly do not comply with this provision.

Although the Respondent urges that there is no dust in the vicinity of the ceiling junction boxes, the record supports the conclusion that an accident can cause dust to rise in the air above the working area.

The investigator cited five areas of the facility for a failure to provide electrical receptacles and attachment plugs approved for Class 2, Division 2 locations. Essentially, the NEC provides that the receptacles and plugs must be designed so that the connection to the electrical circuit cannot be made or broken while live parts are exposed. Most attachment plugs and receptacles are not designed to be used by the Respondent create a small spark when used. Approved equipment operates so that the insertion of one attachment plug into the socket seals the area and the plug then has to be twisted in order to make contact with the source of electricity.

The Respondent's defense is that the Complainant has not shown that there is dust near each receptacle or plug to create a hazard. The testimony did, however, establish in two of the areas that there was an accumulation of dust. It has also been shown that there is generally an accumulation of dust throughout the facility and that leaks can and do occur throughout the facility on occasion. Attachment plugs and receptacles that create a small spark when used can cause or contribute to a fire if there is accumulated dust present. Although the Respondent has mentioned the small distance that a spark can travel the NIOSH has already made the determination that the exposure of live parts is to be prohibited.

The first question to be resolved in regard to the material violations is

whether or not the manlifts constructed prior to adoption of the
OgiA standard
in question were grandfathered out of the coverage of the
standard. Sec-
tion 1910.101(b)(3) provides that all new manlift installations
after the effective date of the standard shall meet the design requirements
of ANSI "and
the requirements of this section". Tie Respondent sees
this language as

exempting any manlift installed before 1971, which is the case with the Respondent's manlift in Fergus Falls. The Respondent presented a 1974 letter from the Federal OSHA Program which advised the Respondent that a manlift in service for 47 years was exempted from "the design requirements in 1910.68". Therefore, a variance was not required for the Minneapolis manlift in question. A 1968 program directive issued by the Federal OSHA advised inspectors as to when the general duty clause should be employed for manlifts installed before 1971, where 1910.68 would be inapplicable.

The Complainant states that it has always interpreted this section to exempt older manlifts only from the ANSI standards, but not from the requirements of 1910.68. The Complainant points out that the alleged grandfather clause appears under the title, "Design Requirements", as opposed to the "General Requirements - Application" section. The Complainant is, of course, not necessarily bound to follow the federal interpretation. It does not appear logical, however, that a grandfather clause intended to exempt all pre-1971 manlifts from the requirement of a section would be buried in a section called "Design Requirements". The language is certainly posed in a peculiar fashion if its intent is to grant such an exemption. The most reasonable construction of 1910.68(b) (3) is simply that all new manlift installations must meet the requirements of 1910-68 and the ANSI standards. It is also reasonable to conclude that older manlifts do not have to meet the ANSI standards, but it requires a leap from logic to conclude that the older manlifts are also completely exempted from the section. None of the requirements in 1910.68 such as the guardrail requirements can be easily applied to manlifts installed before 1971, and the older manlifts as well as the new manlifts would benefit from those provisions. It is, therefore, concluded that the Complainant has correctly interpreted 1910.68(b) (3). The first citation in regard to the manlift involves the functioning of a limit switch or break located above the top floor. The inspector stepped on

to the manlift step from the top floor and the manlift failed to stop but coasted to a stop approximately six feet above the top floor. The Respondent suggests that had the inspector ridden the manlift from the floor below up to the top floor that the switch would then have worked properly. It is concluded that the manner of testing 11, the inspector was not appropriate in order to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the limit switch

was not in proper operating order on the day of the inspection. The record is not clear as to how far the step was above the top floor when the inspector placed his weight upon it. The Respondent's corporate safety director indicated that the switch would operate differently when the step is loaded below the top floor. The investigator is obligated to test a device such as this in the same manner that an employee would use the device.

The investigator also cited the manlift for a failure to provide a five-foot clearance between the top of the manlift and the ceiling.

That is clearly the case. The Respondent states that the suggested solutions of raising the ceiling or not using the manlift to the top floor are impractical. The Respondent has not attempted to (Again a variance from the OSHA-plaintiff in regard to, this requirement. It may be that another safety device in addition to the limit switch would permit a variance to be granted -

The investigator also cited the facility for a failure to place a guard-

rail or gate around the base of the manlift in the basement area.

Both the ascending and descending steps present a hazard to passersby. The Respondent contends that the installation of a guardrail (Or gate would not solve the problem but does not offer a convincing reason for this conclusion.

The entrance and exit to the maintenance platform between the first and second floors of the cleaning house adjacent to the manlift was cited for not having any guardrails or gates to protect the entrance or exit. An employee performing work on the platform could fall through this opening or be struck by a step if he was leaning over.

The standard under which this violation was cited refers, however, to floor landings. The standards seem to make a distinction between floor landings and emergency landings, which are required when there is a distance of 50 feet or more between floor landings. The requirement for emergency landings as contained at 1910-68(b)(6)(v) is that the emergency landing shall be completely enclosed with a standard railing and toe board. The standard also provides that a maintenance platform may serve as an emergency

landing and must then be provided with standard rail-ings and toe boards. A fair construction of the standards, therefore, is that a lesser standard is set for maintenance platforms such as the one in question. The investigator admitted that placing a swinging gate would make it awkward to enter the platform. A lesser standard for maintenance platforms would be justified by the

lesser access to the area by employees as compared to a floor landing.

The

Complainant has failed to prove that the platform in question was a floor

landing -

The electrical panel located in the lab room was cited for a failure to

guard live parts. The door of the panel was closed at the time of the inspection,

however, and when it was opened, an area of the panel was not covered so

that the wiring and contacts were exposed in an area of approximately one

square foot.

The Respondent contends that the panel box was enclosed as required by the

NEC standard since the panel door was shut and it is located in a room where

only one employee works. The purpose of the enclosure, however, is to prevent

employees from accidentally contacting energized parts. The electrical panel

box in question contains circuit breakers controlling lights in at least the

lab room and the offices. It is reasonable foreseeable that employees would

open the panel to check the circuit breakers in the event of an electrical

failure or some other problem. The enclosure provided must be one which

guards live parts against accidental contact. It cannot be assumed that an

employee would never open the electrical panel. The Respondent can take

advantage of the provision of the NEC which allows location in a room accessible

only to qualified persons. Although an electrician might be qualified

to handle; such an exposure, it is clear that any employee could enter the

laboratory and that the one employee who did work there full-time had no particular

expertise which would qualify him to use the electrical panel safely.

7bd Breihari Electric Company, OSHA 12459, Sept. 7, 1976, 4 ORIC

1661, which involved an electrical contractor whose employees (consisted of

seven electricians and two secretaries, is easily distinguished -

The investigator found a general duty clause violation in the failure of

the Respondent to provide guardrails at the top of its metal bins and to provide

a guardrail platform between two bins. The Complainant has shown that a

hazard exists at the workplace and that an accident should it occur would be

serious since a fall from the metal bins would likely be fatal. The installation of guardrails and a platform has been shown to be a feasible safety measure.

The O'Donnell Plaintiff has, however, failed to offer sufficient evidence to show that the condition which existed constituted a recognized hazard. The Plaintiff's

testimony consisted of the investigator's statement that he had observed three other grain elevators where guardrails were used in a similar situation. The investigator testified that in other elevators there may or may not have been guardrails in existence. Generally, a recognized hazard is a condition which is known to be hazardous taking into account the standard of knowledge in the industry. National Realty and Construction Co. v. O'FC, 489 F.2d 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (n. 32). Each general testimony relating to a few similar situations in which the suggested remedy has been employed is insufficient to establish that the milling industry generally recognizes a hazard to employees in the situation. See, Southern Ohio Building Systems, Inc. v. O'F, - F - 2d (6th Cir. 1980, case no. 79-3352 (1981 OAM 1925,429) and GbnAgra, Inc., 1979 OSHD 124,128. Neither has the Complainant established actual knowledge of a hazard on the part of the Respondent through proof of prior citations, warnings to employees, work rules about the area in question, or similar evidence. Vy Lactos Laboratories, Inc., 1973-74 ()SHR 17,573 (8th Cir. 1974); Varion Stephens, dba Oiapran & Stephens OD. , 1977-78 OSHD 521,802. The respondent's plant manager and corporate safety director denied knowledge of the existence of a hazard. There is insufficient evidence in the record to support the conclusion that a recognized hazard existed.

G.A. B.